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Introduction 
Official confirmation that Oak Processionary Moth (OPM: Thaumetopoea processionea) had 
been found in West London in 2006 marked the beginning of a long and difficult campaign to 
eradicate this insect pest from a largely urban setting. Affecting native oaks in public open 
spaces, residential gardens and on privately-owned land, OPM has presented a major 
challenge to plant health authorities charged with controlling the outbreak. This paper 
examines how OPM was managed in London and asks why eradication proved so difficult. It 
identifies and analyses three governance and management challenges faced by those involved 
in the attempted eradication campaign, and assesses the extent to which the specifically urban 
setting of the outbreak intensified these difficulties. 
 
Urban green space and infrastructure can mitigate some of the detrimental impacts on 
biodiversity and human well-being of increasing urbanisation (see FC, 2010).  The planting 
of trees is a key component of many greening strategies, with well demonstrated 
environmental and social benefits (Bowler et al., 2010; Hall et al., 2012; Nowark, 2010). 
Within the UK there is a supportive policy framework for protecting urban woodlands and 
promoting the planting of urban trees (Defra, 2013; FC, 2010a), and public tree planting 
campaigns remain popular (Defra, 2010; GLA, 2011). However, many of the trees planted in 
urban locations are imported from outside the UK, and thus ‘represent a critical pathway for 
pest introductions’ (FC, 2011, p3). The role of urban trees in the spread of new pests and 
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pathogens should be taken seriously, and they may also warn of new threats to the forestry 
environment (FC, 2011).  Urban trees are at particular risk where there is a low diversity of 
species or where monoculture planting can mean that whole areas can be devastated in a 
single outbreak (Raupp et al., 2006). They are frequently planted in unfavourable sites where 
they experience stress, predisposing them to attack and increasing the likelihood that pest 
populations will successfully establish themselves (Poland and McCollough, 2006;  Pauleit et 
al., 2002). 
  
Growing problem of tree pests and diseases 
The OPM outbreak should be considered in a context of growing scientific and public 
concern about the biosecurity threat posed by pests and pathogens to trees and woodlands in 
the UK (see Brasier, 2008; Potter, 2013; Tree Health Taskforce, 2013).  The reason for this 
concern is clear.  The rate of new introductions of invasive forest pathogens into Europe has 
increased markedly over the last 200 years, with 27 currently identified as having entered the 
UK since 1800. For invertebrate plant pests, 114 human-assisted introductions were 
identified between 1970 and 2004, although there was no increase in the rate of introductions 
over time (Santini et al., 2013). The plant trade, particularly in ornamental plants, accounts 
for nearly 90% of these pest introductions, with various studies emphasising the primacy of 
the ‘plants for planting’ pathway in introducing new plant pests and pathogens into the 
European Union (EU) mainly from Asia and North America (Smith et al., 2007). Detection is 
often difficult, pathogens often having lag times of several years between infection and the 
trees developing  external or visible symptoms, meaning there may be no obvious signs at 
ports of entry to indicate contamination (Brasier, 2008).   
 
Social science approaches to outbreaks 
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Learning from past experience about the effective management of outbreaks for eradication 
or containment is crucial (Potter et al., 2011). Although analyses of specific pest outbreaks 
have been published (e.g. Hack 2010; Poland and McCollough 2006), these have tended to 
focus on the biological and epidemiological aspects of outbreaks, with few published studies 
focused on governance and management (though see Gustafsson and Lidskog, 2012 for an 
analysis of risk governance in relation to tree pest outbreaks). Exceptions in the UK include 
Dutch Elm Disease, which was the subject of a recent study examining outbreak management 
over a 40 year period (Tomlinson and Potter, 2010; Potter et al., 2011; Harwood et al., 2011), 
and the current and on-going outbreaks of Phytophthora ramorum and Phytophthora 
kernoviae in the UK, which has also been examined through a plant health governance lens 
(Potter et al., 2011; Tomlinson et al., 2009). Other social science contributions have focussed 
on the legislative framework, policy protocols and risk assessment techniques surrounding 
the regulation of plant and tree pest and disease risks locally and globally (MacLeod et al., 
2010; Mills et al., 2011; Outhwaite 2010).  However, peer-reviewed research on the 
governance and management of a tree pest outbreak in a specifically urban context has been 
lacking until now.   
 
The OPM London Campaign: Background and management strategy 
OPM is long established in mainland Europe, where it is known to cause significant 
defoliation of oaks which, while rarely directly lethal, can significantly weaken affected trees, 
leaving them vulnerable to further attack and other stressors.  OPM also poses a threat to 
public health through skin and respiratory irritation caused by the poisonous hairs on the 
caterpillars. These contain an urticating toxin that can affect humans and animals (Maier et 
al., 2003).   
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OPM  is understood to have first entered the UK in 2006 on a single consignment of amenity 
‘cypress oak’ trees (Quercus robur 'Fastigiata Koster') that had been grown in Italy, shipped 
from The Netherlands during 2004 and planted out in two London locations (Potter et al., 
2013). Some were used to screen a waste water facility on a new housing development site in 
Kew, the rest planted alongside the North Circular Hanger Lane gyratory road system in 
Ealing. A separate outbreak in Pangbourne, Berkshire, in October 2010 was similarly caused 
by an imported Quercus robur planted at a new housing development to replace an existing 
oak that was likely to be adversely affected by building works.  
 
The initial response to the London outbreak was largely confined to the London Boroughs 
(LBs)  affected, but the FC, the UK government agency with responsibility for safeguarding 
tree health, became formally involved in May 2007 with the aim of eradicating the pest. The 
Forestry Commission (FC) conducted a survey, set up an Outbreak Management Team and 
commissioned a pest-specific contingency plan and a Pest Risk Analysis (PRA) (Townsend 
2013). The latter concluded that OPM posed a significant phytosanitary threat. The additional 
serious threat to human health through reactions to the hairs provides additional reasons for 
initiation of measures to manage the pest (Evans, 2007). The FC invoked statutory powers 
under the Plant Health (Forestry) Order 2005 which allows plant health inspectors to enforce 
any appropriate actions needed to eradicate OPM from specific sites. 
 
By 2010, the infested zone had reached 120km
2
, having expanded steadily since 2006.  
Following advice from Forest Research (FR), a ministerial decision was taken to abandon 
attempts to eradicate OPM in favour of containment and a revised strategy was adopted to 
contain the population and slow its rate of spread on the fringes of a 20 km buffer zone 
(Potter et al., 2013). Meanwhile, temporary emergency measures were put in place to reduce 
 5 
the risk from subsequent imports of infested trees while a request to the European 
Commission (EC) to consider designating GB a 'protected zone' (PZ) was made. PZ status 
provides measures to prevent further accidental introductions and came into effect in October 
2014 (FC, 2013). 
 
Despite a reinvigoration of the OPM campaign in London in the form of a new pilot 
enhanced control plan for 2013/14, with funding from Department of Environment, Farming 
and Rural Affairs (Defra) (OPM Advisory Group, 2014), it must be concluded that the 
original attempt to eradicate the pest has failed. It is likely that the UK government faces an 
ongoing commitment to OPM control at a significant recurring annual cost: funding from 
Defra for the 2013 enhanced control plan was estimated at £1.15 million, with an estimated 
further £0.55 million spent by stakeholders (OPM Advisory Group, 2014), whose continued 
support in the future will be essential.  
 
Methodology  
Many commentators are asking why eradication proved so difficult and how best to take the 
management effort forward. In order to assess the governance and management challenges 
faced by those individuals involved in the attempted eradication campaign in the urban 
context we used a qualitative research methodology. 
 
A series of qualitative semi-structured interviews were carried out in 2012 with 20 
individuals who have been involved in the management of OPM in London and Pangbourne 
between 2006 and 2012.  These included representatives of LBs, FC and FR staff, managers 
and owners of private land with OPM, and managers of public land with OPM present. Semi-
structured interviews are useful when seeking information from individuals with specialist or 
 6 
privileged knowledge (Newing, 2011). An interview schedule was prepared with issues to be 
discussed. These related to the key aim of the research which was to identify the reasons why 
the eradication campaign proved so difficult, and the extent to which the particular 
characteristics of the urban environment contributed to the challenges faced. 
 
A targeted sampling method, which involves intentionally selecting the people most relevant 
to the study (Newing, 2011), was used. The initial long list of potential interviewees was 
compiled in consultation with stakeholders involved with the Defra grant TH104 project. 
From this list, the authors sort to interview as many different perspectives from different 
organisations as possible within the given time-frame and resources. This selection was 
confirmed and on occasions expanded using a snow-balling method. This is the process of 
chain referral (Newing, 2011) where interviewees are asked to suggest other relevant 
individuals to be included in the study. A key principle in assessing sample size when using 
semi-structured interviews is the principle of ‘saturation’ (Bryman, 2004) when collecting 
more data produces little new information of importance and when it is possible to identify 
areas of consensus or other patterns in the data. The authors believe that the saturation point 
had been reached in this study. 
 
All the interviews were recorded and transcribed.  A thematic analytical method was used. 
This is “a method for identifying, analysing and reporting patterns (themes) within the data. It 
minimally organises and describes your data set in [rich] detail” (Braun and Clarke, 2006, 
p79). Themes capture important aspects of the data in relation to the research question and 
“represents some level of patterned response or meaning within the data set” (Braun and 
Clarke, 2006, p82).  A deductive or ‘top-down’ approach was used as aspects of the transcript 
relevant to answering the pre-defined research question were coded. These codes from across 
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all the interview transcripts were then collated into themes, which corresponded to the three 
challenges as discussed in the sections that follow. Some of the parts of text coded were 
chosen as example quotes to support the arguments made. Contributions from particular 
individuals are anonymised in the subsequent text. 
 
Government policy documents and other published documentary sources on OPM were used 
to corroborate factual elements of the outbreak with the accounts of the interviewees, 
particularly in relation to the chronological order of events. These are referenced where 
necessary in the discussion that follows. 
 
Results/ Discussion 
Challenge One: Assigning statutory responsibility for urban trees 
The issue of statutory responsibility for urban trees is critical for any discussion of tree pest 
and disease management in towns and cities as there is an unclear policy remit and lead  
within Government departments (Tubby and Webber, 2010). The primary legislation 
governing plant health in Great Britain is the Plant Health Act 1967 (UK Government, 2013) 
and it prescribes the Forestry Commissioners as the 'competent authority’ as regards the 
protection of forest trees and timber (FC, 2013).  Defra has responsibility for nursery trees 
and imported planting stock (with delivery delegated to the Food and Environment Research 
Agency) and the FC has responsibility for forest trees once they are planted. It is less clear 
who has responsibility in the case of urban trees. This grey-area of responsibility is 
acknowledged by the FC in its Tree Health Strategy (2011), which states that ‘in the absence 
of any other body with statutory competence, [the FC] is addressing a number of 
predominantly urban tree pests, such as OPM and Horse Chestnut Bleeding Canker’ (FC, 
2011, p3). It also acknowledges the significant time and research resources they require but 
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argues that the threat is too great to be ignored. Further, the FC goes on to warn that this 
‘existing potentially dangerous gap in statutory cover between trees in the forest and those 
growing elsewhere’ is something that it (FC, 2011, p3) says it will work across central and 
local government to address and this may involve changes in legislation.  
 
Evidence collected through our interviews with key actors involved in managing the outbreak 
suggests that confusion about responsibilities may have been a key factor in delaying 
effective control during the early, critical stages of the outbreak. In the absence of an 
effective surveillance system for tree pests at this time, it was a local authority environmental 
health officer (EHO) who reported the first infestation. However, his ability to act quickly 
was compromised under current Environmental Health legislation (Potter et al., 2013). 
Powers had to be invoked under Part Three of The Environmental Protection Act 1990, 
which allows action to be taken where insects known to be a nuisance or prejudicial to health 
are found on commercial land. Under this legislation the responsibility for removal lay with 
the company managing the land, who responded tardily to the eventual Statutory Plant Health 
Notice that was served on them to deal with the infestation.  An attempt to remove the 
infested trees was unsuccessful because the company delegated to carry out the operation 
were poorly equipped and had little prior experience of removing insect pests like OPM:  
 
‘..they had the suits on and gloves and masks on, and a load of black bin liners… and as they 
were removing the nests and putting them in these bags, you could hear the moths emerging, 
and they were just… flapping about in the bags…they were all over the pavement, they were 
on the walls of the flats…’ (Interviewee A).   
 
 9 
If the outbreak had been on non-commercial land, the options would have been even more 
limited and the EHO would not have been able to use the legislation he did. There would 
have been little the local authority could do, except rely on the good will of the landowners. 
   
In the absence of any immediate management response from either of these central 
government agencies, much of the initial impetus during the summer of 2006 came from 
different parts of local government, chiefly tree officers employed by the LBs of Richmond 
and Ealing. The tree officer from Ealing (Interviewee B) describes how, in relation to the 
outbreak in Ealing, “…the local authority was brought in… as a liaison, so it was before the 
FC got heavily involved or anything like that… and we were… the only place people could 
turn to”. It seems that local authorities played a much more proactive role in managing the 
early stages of the outbreak, well beyond their official remit for managing trees in their 
respective locales. An informal OPM Management Group was convened and then expanded 
its membership to include Emergency Planning officers from Richmond and Ealing, together 
with representatives from The Royal Botanical Gardens, Kew (RBGK), Network Rail and 
some of the other major landowners affected. This met on a weekly or fortnightly basis and 
worked to motivate the individuals involved (Interviewee B). Attempts were also made to 
raise the issue through the local resilience forum, (which aim to plan and prepare for localised 
incidents and catastrophic emergencies) and which involves more senior local authority staff, 
but it has had limited effect (Interviewee B). 
 
The London Tree Officers Association (LTOA) also played a central coordinating role at this 
stage and their contribution was acknowledged by a number of interviewees. Interviewee C 
said that [the LTOA see] “themselves as sort of tree guardians”, they know a lot about “the 
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trees on their patch”, and between them and the [local authority] “planning officers dealing 
with private trees, you’ve got a whole wealth of knowledge as to where oak trees are”.   
 
It has been difficult to establish at what stage Defra Plant Health, the FC, FR and other plant 
health professionals eventually became more directly involved in the OPM outbreak, and 
indeed it is unclear from our interviews why they did not become formally involved before 
May 2007. One reason was that the combined tree and human health impacts of OPM meant 
that this already complex regulatory landscape was further complicated by the need to bring 
the Health Protection Agency (HPA) on board. There were serious discussions over the 
winter of 2006/7 as to whether the FC or the HPA should take statutory responsibility and 
under what legislative powers they should do so. In the end the FC, rather than the HPA, took 
the lead role, and the Plant Health Act became the legal framework for action. This was seen 
largely as a pragmatic solution, as in legal terms there appeared to be limited possibilities for 
intervention on human health grounds: the limitations of the Environmental Health legislation 
have been noted previously, whilst the Public Health Act legislation has historically only 
been used for serious disease events and it was believed it would be difficult to make a case 
for controlling OPM under it (Interviewee D).   Whilst a resolution was finally reached, it is 
clear that this delay in assigning responsibility had an impact on the speed and overall 
effectiveness of the response.  
 
Local authorities, as landowners, are required to comply with any notice served on them by 
the FC using powers under the Plant Health Act. The FC can also require local authorities to 
carry into effect any order under the Plant Health Act and has used this power twice (DED 
and Watermark disease of willow).  This possibility was posited by the FC in relation to 
OPM when it mooted the idea that local authorities should be given powers to serve Statutory 
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Plant Health Notices on landowners with OPM present on their land, requiring them to take 
action to remove the infestation within a given time frame. However, the LBs of Richmond 
and Ealing were not keen to take on a new level of responsibility; they did not want such 
enforcement powers because they felt tree owners within their Boroughs needed someone 
else to go to for support and advice once they have been served with a Statutory Plant Health 
Notice. If the local authorities were doing the enforcing, tree owners might be less inclined to 
report the problem in the first place: “The last thing we wanted to be was the baddie coming 
along and putting enforcement notices on poor old Mrs Miggens that’s just got a tree in her 
back garden”. (Interviewee B). They also believed there would be no new resources to deal 
with it (Interviewee B). The historic case of DED gave such powers to the local authorities 
who wanted them, but without extra funding to carry out the works needed, the level of 
actions by local authorities was very low and ultimately largely ineffective (Tomlinson and 
Potter, 2010).  Like all landowners with OPM on their property, local authorities had to meet 
the cost of managing their trees from existing budgets. For one LB the cost was estimated at 
£30,000 - £40,000 annually, a monetary and resource cost which is anticipated to reoccur 
every year into the foreseeable future (Interviewee E). This is obviously an on-going cost to 
the public purse and has consequences for the level of management action that is taken. 
  
Whilst some local authorities were very proactive in their approach, other Boroughs were 
much less so.  Nevertheless, in the space created by lack of central government or agency 
direction, this case demonstrates the positive contributions that different local Government 
departments can make in responding to a tree pest outbreak in an urban area; a network of 
staff able to work on ‘the ground’ with local residents; staff with specialist knowledge of the 
location and status of local trees; and institutional structures to prepare and respond to civil 
emergencies. However, the role of local Government here was hampered by a lack of 
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resources and inappropriate legal powers. As Tubby and Webber (2010) acknowledge, the 
formal responsibility for local authority staff only extends to managing the trees on local 
authority land.  In the context of OPM, with no remit beyond their designated boundaries, this 
prevents them from taking a lead in local management.  
 
Challenge Two: Assessing and managing combined risks to trees and people  
 
As previously noted, OPM was framed from the beginning as a tree health issue, with the FC 
taking the lead role and the Plant Health Act furnishing the legal framework for action. 
However, there is an important distinction to be drawn between the way in which the issue 
was constructed in terms of legal responsibility and the way in which the risks were 
understood and actions justified by those involved on the ground. Indeed, whilst most 
respondents acknowledged combined risks to tree and human health, there continued to be 
much debate amongst those involved in the West London outbreak as to the relative 
significance of each, how they are related and thus what the management response should be. 
Many interviewees suggested that local government staff were more concerned with the 
public health risk than the risks to tree health. A particular characteristic of the urban London 
environment is the presence of a sizeable oak tree population in a densely human populated 
area. As Interviewee F explained, it is the high number of “oak trees in that intense sort of 
urban matrix” [that occur in some parts of London] that is seen to be a risk factor for the 
number of people who might be affected “if this [OPM outbreak] takes off in very, very 
heavily oaked urban areas here.”  Thus the urban setting also effects the judgement about 
relative risk and the seriousness of consequences: 
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“….the only reason we [as a local authority] manage trees in the way we do is because 
there are people living under them every day… Infestation to one tennis ball sized nest in 
a tree will have no impact on the tree… Whereas, if that was in a public park and people 
sat under that tree, or if, God forbid, that nest fell off and someone picked it up, the 
implications on that person or those persons would be massive” (Interviewee B)  
 
Indeed, Jim Smith, Urban Forestry Adviser at the FC, has suggested that with regard to tree 
pests and diseases in urban areas, health and safety considerations will take priority over 
landscape, amenity and economic concerns (Smith, 2013).  This could be problematic if fears 
over public safety lead to inappropriate and disproportionate management responses that lead 
to the loss of trees and their benefits, as has been raised in the case of Massaria Disease of 
Plane (Tibbets, 2013; FC, 2013a). 
 
Tree health problems were seen by some interviewees to be more of an issue for forestry 
areas, where they can have an impact on commercial production. The approach to managing 
outbreaks elsewhere in Europe appears to maintain this distinction (Potter et al., 2013). In 
Holland, the urban setting of many of the outbreaks has led to OPM being largely viewed and 
managed as a human health problem affecting the general public, with woodland outbreaks 
often left unmanaged, partly for biodiversity and conservation reasons, and with the hope that 
natural predators may keep the moth under control. In Germany, the impact has more 
frequently been seen in large commercial forests. There, management for tree protection has 
been the focus, prompting large-scale spraying using helicopters, although human health 
effects are now being seen amongst forest workers.    
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This dichotomy might not always hold true, however. OPM might pose a threat to already 
vulnerable trees in urban park settings. Richmond Park and its many mature veteran oaks in 
decline or already suffering from other problems are a good example, as OPM could lead to a 
significant loss of trees. Further, in urban areas the two risks are related: Serious threats to 
trees occur when infestation levels reach plague proportions (unless the tree is already in 
decline for another reason); it is at this point that the outbreak is also likely to pose the 
greatest threat to human health due to the abundance of hairs. Thus it is argued that in West 
London, the management actions so far have meant that that “We haven’t seen any 
defoliation of trees because the numbers aren’t big enough, so therefore, the plant health issue 
I don’t think is an issue”, yet “…it’s a tree issue that, if unmanaged, becomes a public health 
issue, essentially”. (Interviewee E).   
 
Did the disparity between the tree health focus of the Plant Health Act and the public health 
priorities of many of those involved in responding to the outbreak in this urban area have any 
material consequences for the London campaign? Many interviewees argued that if it had 
been framed officially as a public health issue rather than a plant health concern, OPM would 
have gained greater traction within government, leading to greater allocation of resources.  
Some interviewees suggested that a human health justification might have been more 
effective in persuading private residents with infested trees in their gardens to cooperate with 
management.  Instead, the FC and its Plant Health Inspectors were required to make the case 
for action on plant health grounds and not to use public health arguments when 
communicating with the public.  
 
 Challenge Three: Coordinating the stakeholder and landowner response in a complex urban 
setting  
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A key cause of the ineffective response to the OPM outbreak identified by our interviewees 
was the difficulty of engaging effectively with the wide range and number of stakeholders, 
particularly public and private landowners with OPM infestation on their land. The urban 
matrix of “a mosaic of different ownerships and responsibilities” (Interviewee F) over a 
relatively small area added a particular complexity and challenge to attempts to deal with 
OPM in West London. As Interviewee J commented:  
 
 “I suspect that if you were in the heart of the countryside, where you might have had 
only been dealing with three or four land managers in an area of a few square miles, it 
would have been much, much more achievable. I’m sure there’s plenty of people who’ve 
never heard of OPM that live very close to here”. 
  
Jim Smith, FC’s Urban Forestry Adviser, corroborates this:  “Multiple land ownership, 
tenancy and absentee landlords predicate against swift and effective action via existing 
legislation” (Smith, 2013). Several interviewees commented on the particular issues this 
raised for effective control given that an infestation can spread from an un-managed area into 
uninfested or previously cleared areas: 
 
“You’re in an urban area where you have local authority trees, and next door, you have 
the railway, … and then next door to that you have a private business, and then next door 
to that you have a fairly poor old lady, and every one of those sites has to be cleared of 
OPM, and if you don’t do all of them, then you’ve all wasted your time” (Interviewee F). 
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On land identified with an infestation, landowners, their site managers, occupiers or other 
representatives are served by Inspectors from the FC with a Notice under Article 31(4) of the 
Plant Health (Forestry) Order 2005 requiring them to use appropriate methods (see Table 1; 
FC, 2012) and within a prescribed time frame. Decisions by landowners about which 
treatments to use were made not only on the basis of perceptions of their relative costs and 
effectiveness, but also in relation to the specific ecological and economic contexts of different 
outbreak sites. This can be clearly illustrated by the contrasting approaches taken by two 
significant landowners affected by OPM: RBGK, and Richmond Park. The former, a 121 ha 
site, initially used nest removal, but then shifted to using Deltamethrin on 400 trees which 
was reported as much more successful.  Diflubenzuron was then tried on subsequent 
infestations as a way of reducing the impact on biodiversity, as it is specific to caterpillars, 
whereas Deltamethrin is a broad spectrum pyrethoid and is known to be particularly 
dangerous to bees (FC, 2012). Chemical treatments are seen as necessary in ensuring public 
safety whilst keeping the park open but their biodiversity impacts are being monitored 
(Interviewee K).  
Richmond Park is a much larger site of 2,500 ha with 40,000 oak trees, including veteran 
specimens, and with various conservation designations including a site of national importance 
for the conservation of invertebrate fauna associated with decaying timber of ancient trees 
(JNCC, 2013). With the need to balance biodiversity protection with ensuring the safety of 
the park’s visitors, there has been an emphasis on wide scale nest removal using volunteers. 
However, in 2011 the Park obtained consent from Natural England to conduct a trial spray of 
Bacillus thuringiensis (Bt) on six trees, and in 2012 they had consent to spray 15 trees 
(Interviewee L). Richmond Park intends to continue using a combination of nest removal and 
spraying.  It has been criticised for not making more use of chemical treatments and 
potentially contributing to the continued spread of OPM, yet others acknowledge that their 
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statutory conservation responsibilities prevented such measures being taken and that the Park 
has actually suffered from its neighbours taking insufficient action (Interviewee G).   
 
Once the Notice had been served, landowners who failed to take action within the required 
time could in theory be threatened with legal action. However, there have been no legal 
proceedings recorded to date. Some interviewees speculated that this is because the FC 
cannot to afford to pay to go through the legal processes, and that legal advice has suggested 
that if they took landowners to court under Statutory Plant Health Notices the cases were 
unlikely to be successful. For some interviewees, this ‘softly softly’ approach compromised 
the effectiveness of the Notice system:  
 
“The point is, unless a notice is served, the FC are powerless to take any action. That’s 
what gives the legal force. But the serving of a Statutory Plant Health Notice for nest 
removals is basically pointless, I think... because too many people ignore it. They [the 
FC] serve the notices, full of threats “We will prosecute you”, this, that and the other – 
well, they haven’t done it. Clearly, it hasn’t been done, and the word has spread” 
(Interviewee M). 
 
Whilst one interviewee acknowledged that Statutory Plant Health Notices could facilitate 
land managers in securing funding from their organisations (Interviewee K), it was seen by 
many others as a flawed system because, in line with standard practice, compensation cannot 
be offered for the management required and thus the landowner has to bear the costs. This 
has consequences. It gives an incentive for landowners not to comply with the Statutory Plant 
Health Notice, particularly, as noted above, as it was widely assumed that legal sanctions 
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would not be enforced. It was also thought to encourage non-disclosure of infestations, with 
landowners being reluctant to report for fear of having to shoulder the costs of management.  
 
Once an OPM infestation has occurred, management is on-going. In the absence of any 
compensation, this means landowners face an annual on-going cost for management. For 
example, annual spraying at RBGK costs about £10,00 whilst the London Borough of 
Richmond expect to be spending £20,000 to £40,000 a year, and Transport for London 
estimates an additional £50,000 annual expenditure on OPM control. 
 
Many interviewees had strong views on how the outbreak could have been better managed, 
but the issue of paying compensation was critical for many:  
 
“The statutory notice route, without compensation, is doomed to fail. …  [The 
FC] spend a lot of time finding tree owners. Once [they’ve] found them they 
may or may not co-operate. If it was just straightforward, look, [the FC are] 
coming in and we’re doing it, then there would have been a lot more chance of 
eradication”. (Interviewee M). 
The Forestry Commissioners “have no powers to pay compensation, and historically it has 
been the policy of successive governments not to pay compensation for plants and trees lost 
through pests and diseases or the measures required to eradicate them.  This remains the case 
today” (FC, 2013b).  Historically, trees removed for pest or disease management would still 
hold value that could be recovered by the owner when the timber was sold (Interviewee G). 
Due to this, compensation was not paid for action on OPM. However, there is confusion 
though about the legal grounds of the Government policy as the Plant Health Act stipulates 
that “The Minister or Secretary of State may pay compensation in respect of any crop, or any 
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seed, plant or part thereof, which is removed or destroyed by or under the instructions of an 
inspector authorised by him; and its value shall be taken to be the value which it has at the 
time of the removal or destruction” (UK Government, 2013). This appears to have little 
relevance to urban or suburban areas where the trees do not have a timber value. 
However, there are two recent cases where the costs of management have been met by the FC 
and not by landowners. During a recent Asian Longhorn Beetle (ALB) outbreak in Kent, the 
FC paid ‘all operational costs and did all operational work on the ground’. This was in 
recognition that many of the garden owners would not have been able to afford to take trees 
down (Interviewee G) and it was necessary to ensure rapid action to eradicate the outbreak. 
The second example brings the story of OPM up- to-date with the previously mentioned new 
pilot enhanced control strategy. Of the just over a million pounds spent by Defra under the 
new pilot enhanced control plan, a total £411,000 was spent on paying for the prophylactic 
spraying of 40,000 trees so that the cost did not have to be borne by the landowner. Whilst 
there is caution towards any analysis of this scheme with only one year’s results, particularly 
given that the wet summer and late on-set of Spring is likely to have reduced OPM numbers, 
there was a 53% decrease in the number of nests between 2013/14.  Under this scheme, there 
was an increase in the number of Statutory Plant Health Notices being issued between 2012 
(53 issued) and 2013 (275). It is reported that a far higher level of co-operation from 
landowners enabled the implementation of a thorough control programme: “a key factor 
supporting this was the control costs not falling upon the Statutory Plant Health Notice 
recipient” (OPM Advisory Group, 2014, p6). The question remains as to whether this 
approach can continue into the future given the level of funding required; at the time of 
publication no public announcement has been made as to whether continued Defra funding 
has been secured 
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Conclusions 
 
The OPM London campaign illustrates the challenges - legal, administrative and operational - 
in managing a tree pest outbreak in an urban setting.  Our analysis raises questions about the 
suitability and effectiveness of the current policy and legal framework for the management of 
plant and tree pests in an urban context but also highlights the considerable operational 
challenges of enforcing control measures amongst a diverse community of stakeholders and 
landowners. In terms of the overall coordination of the eradication effort, the current ‘grey 
area’ of responsibility for urban trees emerges as an especially problematic issue. 
Administrative ambiguity in the OPM case was further exacerbated by the public health 
dimension, with different government agencies having to invest time early in the outbreak to 
establishing where the boundaries of responsibility lay for its overall management. Against 
this, we found evidence of the positive contribution made by local government officials, 
particularly tree officers and environmental health staff, during the critical early stages.  
 
Experience with the OPM London outbreak clearly shows that in operational terms, the 
presence of a wide range of public and private landowners, together with the inaccessibility 
of infested trees scattered across numerous private gardens, presented significant difficulties 
in co-ordinating an effective management response. Landowners had different priorities and 
this was reflected in the varying extent to which they were willing to report new infestations 
and/or implement management controls. These priorities related primarily to the management 
strategy of their land in areas with conservation objectives, or financial imperatives based on 
continuing public access. In urban areas, protecting public health and safety will be a priority 
and this will need to be balanced with the imperative of protecting tree health.  
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More broadly, the London campaign raises questions about the applicability of existing plant 
health legislation and statutory framings, mainly designed with pests and diseases of 
commercial forestry trees in mind, to urban settings where threats to human health and 
amenity are much more likely to be present.  In the case of OPM, it was the FC that took on 
the responsibility, using its powers under the Plant Health Act, in the absence of any more 
suitable policy or legal framework that might have dealt better with the public health 
implications of the outbreak. The use of the Plant Health Act proved problematic, particularly 
in relation to the use of Statutory Plant Health Notices and an inability to pay ‘compensation’ 
to landowners. As discussed above, the cases of ALB and the one-year project for OPM 
suggest that different funding models could improve landowner compliance. Evidence from 
the OPM outbreak suggests there is a need for consideration by authorities on how coherent 
management of future tree pest outbreaks might be best financed to enable a timely and 
effective response. 
 
Clearly, responding to tree pest outbreaks such as OPM entails an economic cost that needs to 
be balanced against other demands on the public finances.  Furthermore, new ‘known’ and 
‘unknown’ pests and diseases are anticipated to occur in the UK and there is clearly much 
strength in the argument that they should be prevented from arriving in the first place.  The 
risks posed by the global trade in ‘plants for planting’ have been discussed elsewhere, as have 
the limitations of the existing plant health legislation that exists to minimise such accidental 
introductions (Tubby and Webber, 2010; Brasier, 2008). Such an imperative should not be at 
the detriment of urban tree planting schemes and risks can be significantly reduced by 
sourcing trees entirely grown in the UK. 
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